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C h a p t e r  1  
I n t r o d u c t i o n  
1 . 1  P r o b l e m  A r e a  
 On February 2nd 2013 The Economist published an article called ‘The Nordic Countries: The 
Next Supermodel’ in which especially Denmark, Sweden and Norway have been doing ‘rather well’ 
throughout the financial crisis beginning in 2008 (The Economist, 2013). 
 The Nordic countries have to some extent escaped the clutches of the recent financial crisis 
(Milne, 2012). It has hit these countries less fiercely compared to some of the southern European 
countries such as Greece and Spain even though public expenditure in the Nordic countries could be 
considered as being higher than would be sustainable (The Economist, 2013). 
 A part of the answer may be found in the way the systems in the Nordic countries are 
constructed and how the citizens relate themselves to the state and the size of the state. In Sweden 
for example, citizens are more willing to pay tax than citizens in California because the Swede gets 
decent schools and free health care (ibid). 
This relation between citizen and state surely calls for a description not only of how the 
Nordic countries economically seem to avoid the crisis, but also how they politically try to do it. 
It would thus be interesting to explore different theoretical frameworks which attempt to 
describe how the Nordic systems are constructed. One of the theoretical frameworks that seek to 
investigate these special systems is the Social Investment Perspective published by Nathalie Morel, 
Bruno Palier and Joakim Palme in 2012. This makes it a very recent theory which is easily 
compatible with contemporary events such as the recent development of the Nordic countries. It 
should be noted that the theory has been a long time underway and draws inspiration from different 
sets of ideas including the welfare regimes of Gøsta Eping-Andersen (ibid). 
The theory itself actually embodies two major branches; The Third Way and the Social 
Democratic branch. The latter is the one favoured by this project due to the fact that it relates well 
with the social democratic welfare states existing in the Nordic countries (Morel, Palier & Palme, 
2012). 
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The Social Democratic branch of Social Investment Perspective elaborates on the Social 
Democratic mind set. It improves on this by having a focus on three central pillars namely family 
policy, educational policy and active labour market policy. All three pillars are interesting to look at 
in regards to the political and economic development of the Nordic countries, although this project 
has chosen to mainly focus on active labour market polices and to a lesser extent educational policy. 
What is worth investigating is the relation between the Social Investment State and one of the 
Nordic countries. As Denmark is one of the Nordic countries that according to the theory excel in 
pursuing the Social Investment Perspective this country was chosen as a area of analysis (Morel, 
Palier & Palme, 2012: 112).  
Through the 1990's Denmark was led by a Social Democratic lead government and it 
therefore becomes relevant to investigate more specifically how and to what extent the country 
under this form of government has pursued the Social Investment Perspective. 
 In 1993, the Danish Social Democratic government, lead by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, was 
elected which led to a series of reforms of the labour market (Danmarkshistorien, 2013). During the 
1990's under the Social Democratic government and from 2001 to 2011 under the liberal 
government Denmark saw a series of reforms of the labour market some of them perhaps influenced 
by the economic crisis that hit in 2008. These reforms can be analyzed in the light of the Social 
Investment Perspective and they lay the foundation for this project’s empirical data. 
For these reasons it becomes interesting to investigate Danish labour market reforms from 
1993 to 2012. In this way one can both include the entire Social Democratic period of the 1990's, 
the liberal government from 2001 to 2011 along with the period immediately after the financial 
crisis in order to get a more coherent picture of the development towards a Social Investment 
Perspective. Thus, the following question is asked: 
 
 
1 . 2  P r o b l e m  F o r m u l a t i o n  
How is Denmark moving towards a Social Investment Perspective when looking at labour 
market policy changes from 1993 to 2012? 
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1 . 3  R e s e a r c h  Q u e s t i o n s  
− What labour market policy changes have been implemented since 1993 until  
 2012? 
− How does the specific reforms or changes relate to the Social Investment Perspective? 
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C h a p t e r  2  
M e t h o d s  
2 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
In this chapter the methodological approach will be presented. The chapter will first of all 
contain an overview of the project to help guide the reader. The research questions and the problem 
formulation will then be elaborated on in order to make their purpose clear. The chapter will 
moreover contain the project’s analytical strategy explaining how this project will go about the 
theory, its empirical data and which conclusions that can and cannot be drawn. Furthermore, a 
description of the choice of theory and choice of empirical data follows. The project will then 
present the limitations of the theory, the empirical data and the analysis. Finally, the project’s 
concept definitions are presented in order to make the use of these clear throughout the project. 
 
2 . 2  R e s e a r c h  D e s i g n  
This project begins by utilizing a literature review of the theory in order to clarify the 
essential and relevant parts of said theory (Bryman: 2008: Pp. 8). In this part of the project the main 
points of the theory are underlined and described in chapter 3. It is important to stress that the 
project does not discuss the theory in this chapter. In the literature review the project investigates 
the theory in order to create a basis for a discussion in later chapters. 
 In order to gather the relevant empirical data the project utilizes a quantitative research 
design. This means that the project needs a sufficient amount of data in order to show the trends on 
the Danish labour market (Bryman: 2008: Pp. 163). 
 Due to a limited time period this project makes use of a case study in different aspects of the 
empirical field. In regards to the theoretical perspective the project only analyses the most relevant 
parts of the theory. This includes the theory's view and description of active labour market policy, 
to some extent educational policy, but not family policy (Morel, Palier & Palme: 2012). The case 
study methodology in regards to the theory makes it possible to describe and focus on certain parts 
of the theory (Bryman: 2008: Pp. 48). 
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This project has chosen to focus on Denmark and thus leaves out other countries that might 
have been equally relevant to study and discuss. This allows for a more in depth study of the more 
specific area (Bryman: 2008: Pp. 48). 
2 . 3  R e s e a r c h  Q u e s t ' i o n s  &  P r o b l e m  F o r m u l a t i o n  
In the following the research questions and problem formulation will be elaborated on in 
order to explain the use of the different research questions and their relation to the problem 
formulation. 
2 . 3 . 1  R e s e a r c h  Q u e s t i o n s  
o What labour market policy changes have been implemented since 1993 to  
 2012. 
This question will clarify and outline the changes in social policy reforms from 1993 until 2012. 
Light will thus be shed upon the different labour market policies implemented, that is, 
unemployment benefits, social security, early retirement benefit, state pension and disability 
pension in order to lay an empirical foundation for the further analysis. 
  
o How do the specific reforms or changes relate to the Social Democratic Social 
Investment Perspective? 
This research question will more specifically relate the theoretical framework to the gathered 
empirical data presented with the previous research question. By looking at the specific reform 
changes within the specific labour market policies, this question will, in accordance with the Social 
Investment Perspective seek to describe how the Danish welfare system has developed in the given 
time period and whether or to what extent it has been in accordance with the Social Investment 
Perspective. 
 
2 . 3 . 2  P r o b l e m  F o r m u l a t i o n   
How is Denmark moving towards a Social Investment Perspective when looking at labour 
market policy changes from 1993 to 2012? 
 
With this problem formulation this project seek to provide an overview of the relationship 
between the policies made in Denmark in the period 1993 to 2012 and the theory of Social 
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Investment. This question will be answered by outlining the relevant points of the theory and by 
describing and creating and overview of the relevant labour market reforms in the period 1993 to 
2012.  The reforms will then be discussed in light of the theory. It is with this discussion as a basis 
that the project attempts to conclude on how Denmark is moving towards the Social Investment 
Welfare State. 
 
2 . 4  S o c i a l  S c i e n t i f i c  T h e o r y  
In the following, this project’s analytical strategy, choice of theory and choice of empirical 
data is presented. 
 
2 . 4 . 1  A n a l y t i c a l  S t r a t e g y  
This project is utilising a deductive approach as it applies empirical data to an established 
theoretical framework (Olsen & Pedersen 2008: 151). By applying the empirical data to the 
theoretical framework, proposed by Nathalie Morel, Bruno Palier and Joakim Palme, this project 
will try to answer whether and to what extent Denmark is following the Social Investment approach 
in the time period from 1993 to 2012. This is done by looking at the different labour market policies 
implemented in the given period. 
These different labour market policies will be unemployment benefit, social security, early 
retirement benefit, state pension and disability pension. They will each be examined through the use 
of secondary quantitative data and be compared to the theoretical framework in order to outline the 
development of the Danish welfare state. 
 
2 . 4 . 2  C h o i c e  o f  T h e o r y  
 The Social Investment Perspective is chosen as it is a fairly new theory representing another 
view on Welfare that is emerging throughout welfare states across especially Europe. As the 
welfare states face increasingly difficult times it is interesting to investigate what these difficulties 
entail. Denmark and the rest of Scandinavia is in the Social Investment Perspective regarded as the 
prime pursuers of the theory and therefore this project found it relevant to apply Danish empirical 
data on labour market reforms to investigate more in depth how and whether Denmark is moving 
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towards a Social Investment Perspective considering labour market reforms since 1993 until 2012. 
The Social Investment Perspective thus enables this project to analyse the Danish labour market 
reforms and map out the tendencies the Danish welfare state faced (Morel, Palier & Palme, 2012: 
68). 
 
2 . 4 . 3  C h o i c e  o f  E m p i r i c a l  D a t a  
 The empirical data in this project was mainly gathered from annual reports made by the 
Danish bank of statistics. It is thus secondary quantitative data which is utilised in the project. 
 The empirical data contains info on labour market reforms in Denmark, regarding transfer 
payments and pensions along with social security and unemployment benefits in the period from 
1993 until 2012. This data lay the foundation for further analysis, as developments in them 
elucidate tendencies in the development of the Danish welfare state towards a Social Investment 
Perspective. 
 The empirical data on unemployment benefit, social security, early retirement benefit, state 
pension and disability pension are thus used as important markers to investigate whether Denmark 
is moving towards the Social Investment Perspective. 
2 . 5  O t h e r  R e l e v a n t  T h e o r i e s  
Since this project’s focus is to find out whether and to what extend Denmark is moving 
towards the Social Investment Perspective other theories are not relevant to utilise. The analysis is 
thus focused on how the empirical data found corresponds with the theory. Had this project instead 
chosen another focus such as to analyse welfare paradigms and how one paradigm became 
dominant, thus investigating power relations in society, there would be a range of theorists able to 
be utilised. 
2 . 6  L i m i t a t i o n s  
In the following the limitations of the theory, analysis and empirical data is presented 
2 . 6 . 1  L i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  T h e o r y  a n d  A n a l y s i s   
By having chosen the Social Investment Perspective as our theoretical framework it is worth 
mentioning the certain limitations this choice entails. 
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This project has chosen to focus mainly on one pillar of the Social Investment Perspective. The one 
pillar this project is focusing on is active labour market policy. Active labour market policy is 
labour market policy that serves to support citizen’s entrance or return to the labour market such as 
student benefits or unemployment benefits. They are therefore not passively supporting the citizen 
in this understanding. When analysing many of the reforms this project will also touch upon 
education, another important pillar of the Social Investment Perspective, but only when it seems 
relevant. This project will also not engage in the last pillar, namely family policy. 
Thus, it can be argued that this project does not utilise the Social Investment Perspective fully. The 
conclusions this project is going to draw must therefore be read with the above choice in mind. 
 
2 . 6 . 2  L i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  E m p i r i c a l  D a t a  
 As mentioned this project primarily focuses on the labour market in Denmark and does 
thereby not describe other areas of society. Thus, the empirical data does not focus on investments 
in kindergartens or parks and recreations as these are not seen as relevant for the further analysis in 
the limited time available. Furthermore, the empirical material allows this project to look at the 
overall development of the tendencies towards a Social Investment Perspective in the Danish 
society. This project does not seek to look at the consequences for specific individuals or extreme 
minorities. The empirical data does not allow this either.  
 
2 . 7  C o n c e p t  D e f i n i t i o n s  
In the following different concepts important for the understanding of the further project is 
described.  
2 . 7 . 1  T h e  D a n i s h  W e l f a r e  S t a t e  
Welfare societies are “[…] wealthy, democratic societies with a market economy and a 
comprehensive social security.” (Mogensen, 2010: 15). According to Mogensen the term “wealthy” 
should ideally be defined by the average income of the citizens in a given society, but as these 
numbers are defined differently in various societies it can become rather difficult to measure. 
Instead wealth is typically measured in BNP per citizen (2010). Mogensen defines the concept 
“welfare state” as a state where the public part of the distribution of welfare is primary (2010). This 
includes countries like the Scandinavian and Germany. In, what is defined as “the Other Welfare 
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States”, social security is to a large extent outsourced to the private sector through private insurance 
and job related conditions (Mogensen, 2010). 
 
Historically the primary objective of the welfare state was to help handicapped and elderly 
groups who had no prospects of returning to the active workforce. (Mogensen, 2010) As soon as the 
governments began to help the unemployed or the temporarily sick another factor came into play, 
namely a plan that enabled these vulnerable groups to enter the workforce. The interest in this 
problem came to develop the concept of welfare into a general safety of the population; it advanced 
into help the wider population (Mogensen, 2010) 
 
According to Bent Greve it may be argued that ”[…] at least in the modern world, without the 
state many of these other sources of welfare may function with difficulty.” (Greve, 2013: 11). It is 
furthermore argued that a functioning state is one of the core building blocks of welfare states 
(2013: 11-12). It is argued that the state itself must provide all of the welfare needs of its own 
citizens as well as being subject to change. This means that it should be possible for a given 
population within a welfare state to change the government of said state. 
 
2 . 7 . 2  T h e  S o c i a l  D e m o c r a t i c  S o c i a l  I n v e s t m e n t  P e r s p e c t i v e  
When this project mentions the Social Investment Perspective it refers to the social 
democratic branch of the Social Investment Perspective. The Social Democratic branch of the 
Social Investment Perspective is different from the Third Way branch in that it has a greater focus 
on real activation instead of ‘conditionalities’, that is conditions for receiving benefits (Morel, 
Palier & Palme, 2012). Conditionalities are used typically in the Anglo-Saxon countries, whereas 
actual activation is primarily utilised in the Nordic countries. In this way the Social Democratic 
branch parts with the neoliberal paradigm, while the Third Way embraces it (ibid). 
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C h a p t e r  3  
T h e o r e t i c a l  F r a m e w o r k  
3 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
In this chapter, the historical development and context of the Social Investment Perspective 
will be elaborated on. The Social Investment Perspective itself will then be described.  
3 . 2  T h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  D a n i s h  W e l f a r e  S t a t e  i n  a  
H i s t o r i c a l  a n d  E c o n o m i c  C o n t e x t  
The overview of the historical development will shed light upon the shifts in economic and 
political paradigms, from Keynesianism to Neoliberalism to the now emerging Social Investment 
Perspective. It is crucial to place the Social Investment Perspective in a historical context as it 
furthers the understanding of the emerging paradigm as being both a development, but also a 
contrast to the preceding paradigms. It must be understood that the Social Investment Perspective 
has not superseded the other paradigms, especially Neoliberalism, but merely exists among them 
embracing a number of their core elements. 
3 . 2 . 1  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S i t u a t i o n  o f  t h e  1 9 7 0 ’ s  
The historical development of the Danish welfare state does in this project start at the year 
1970. It was a year before the Bretton Woods system, with its fixed exchange rates, broke down and 
the government had to face new challenges in regards to the declining economic tendencies 
(Mogensen, 2010: 116). In the time up to the breakdown of Bretton Woods, wages increased rapidly 
in many European countries. In France for instance, the minimum wages increased 35 percent in the 
end of the 1960's (ibid: 115). This left politicians to deal with high inflation, decreasing 
competitiveness and unstable exchange rates when the oil crisis struck in 1973 (ibid: 117-118). 
With the outbreak of the oil crisis, unemployment in Denmark doubled from the historically lowest 
level of two percent and doubled again with the second oil crisis in 1979. The two crises revealed 
the larger structural problems of the Danish welfare society with higher wages, inflation and 
unemployment. Before the crisis, unemployment and inflation was seen as two unavoidable 
negatives that needed to be balanced against each other to create economic stability and growth. 
After 1973, Denmark however experienced both inflation and economic stagnation with higher 
unemployment, the so called 'stagflation' (ibid: 118).  
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3 . 2 . 2  T h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  E c o n o m i c  S o l u t i o n s  
To understand why there needed to be a shift in the way that economic policies were dealt 
with, it is important to understand the basic mechanisms and economic 'ideological' principles that 
were in use before the break down of Bretton Woods and the oil crisis. The economic ideology is 
commonly referred to that of Keynesianism. In the following Keynesianism will be explained since 
it has its place in the historical development of the Danish welfare state. 
 
Firstly, this project will look at the role of economical hegemony of the time before and into 
the 1970's. This period laid the foundation for a change in the dominating economic sphere, which 
again reflected the development of the welfare states in the post war period. The Keynesian era is 
also known as the ‘golden days’ of welfare expansion (Morel, Palier & Palme: 6). It linked 
problems of unemployment and low growth to insufficient demand for labour and argued that 
”[...]public spending in particular could function as an important regulator which could be 
used to stimulate the economy at time of slump or dampen growth if it happened too quickly “(ibid: 
5). 
In short, spending on social policies were seen as a useful tool in helping to balance the 
economy out of recession, as it would help maintain workers’ wages and thereby prop up demand 
and stimulate growth. Due to Keynesianism, welfare states saw major increases in expenditure on 
social policies. Any social expenditure was seen as a good expenditure ultimately leading to the 
development of the post-war welfare states. This particular part of Keynesian economics is also 
known as demand-side economics, referring to the stimulation of the demand of labour in order to 
increase growth and employment (ibid: 6). 
 
The purpose was to gain economic growth through increased purchasing power, by 
maintaining full employment (ibid: 33-34). Fundamental for Keynesianism was that economic 
activity is determined by ‘animal spirits’, by this is meant waves of optimism and pessimism. To 
counter fluctuation Keynes argued that modern governments should make use of discretionary 
monetary and fiscal policies. This would sustain long-term economic stability and enhance 
productive capacity (ibid: 37). 
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In order to maintain full employment, Keynesianism supported the use of social insurance in 
its basic form. 
“Workers contributed to social security, ensuring them future protection against the risks of 
cyclical and frictional unemployment through benefits that replaced a portion of their previous 
salary for a set period of time, usually long enough to return to work when labour demand 
increased” (ibid: 37). 
It is Important to emphasise that in Keynesianism, by full employment is meant “[...] 48 
hours a week, with 48 working weeks a year, for a period of 48 years” (ibid: 38). This definition 
assumed that men were the ‘breadwinners’ whereas the women were the caretakers. Women would 
take care of the weaker groups in society e.g. young children or the elders, meaning that women 
were not considered as being part of the workforce. Central to Keynesianism was not only to 
maintain full employment, but to reduce income inequalities and to invest in health and education 
were also seen as important instruments in boosting economic growth and further provide the means 
for expansion of social rights. The welfare state expansion alongside significant declines in income 
inequalities, were perceived as the most efficient strategy to boost economic growth.  
 
The wage increases and the policy changes complementing wage bargaining structures, 
introduced to maintain the purchasing power of those worst off in the 1960's, triggered a self-
reinforcing inflationary dynamic. At the same time fixed exchange rates were replaced by a system 
of floating currencies triggering additional economic instability (ibid: 39-40). These changes along 
with the oil crises of the 1970’s, increased unemployment to new levels, which then triggered an 
increase in social security expenditures. This ‘stagflation’ companied with high unemployment 
proved the Keynesian approach, of maintaining full employment while preserving generous social 
protection, unsustainable. In other words welfare provision, it was perceived, had ‘grown to its 
limits’ (ibid: 40). 
 
As Keynesianism was unable to explain - let alone solve the crises of stagflation, the 
Neoliberal thoughts began to gain influence. In contrast to Keynesianism, Monetarists looked at the 
supply side of the economy, and as a way of dealing with stagflation monetarists argued that: “[...] 
governments are best advised to keep money supply going steadily at a rate equal to the growth of 
aggregate supply, so as to suppress inflationary expectations.” (ibid: 39-40). 
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3 . 2 . 3  1 9 8 0 ’ s :  T h e  E r a  o f  W e l f a r e  R e t r e n c h m e n t  a n d  N e w  W a v e  
o f  N e o l i b e r a l  E c o n o m i c s  
In the beginning of the 1980's focus shifted in the economic policies towards having stabile 
prices and good conditions for corporations. It was a break with the Keynesian economic policies 
and a move towards more liberal economic tendencies. Having stable prices and controlling interest 
rates would, in theory, make the labour market accept lower increases in wages and therefore 
increase competitiveness and productivity (Mogensen, 2010: 119). This neoliberal perception of 
looking at the economy was developed in the USA and spread to Europe. It was sealed with the 
election of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, leading to an epoch in European policy 
dominated by conservative coalitions. The objective of full employment was traded with a focus on 
balanced budgets, stable currencies, central bank independency, low inflation, privatisation and 
welfare retrenchment (ibid). 
The 1980's thus meant the introduction of a more liberal take on economic policies. It was a 
counter movement to Keynesianism that had dominated economic policies until the late 1970's. The 
following will deal with the more technical aspects of the policies in order to see its impacts on the 
idea of the welfare state. 
The neoliberals perceived the generous welfare states as having a negative impact on 
economic growth as “[g]enerous social policy was held responsible for poor job-search motivation 
and for creating a culture of dependency [...]” (Morel, Palier & Palme: 2012: 7) and therefore 
argued for a minimisation of social policy. Difference in income was also perceived as being 
essential to economic growth as it constitutes a crucial incentive - this will ensure that labour supply 
and demand are matched, and the maximum outcome is realised (ibid: 41-42). In short, inequality 
makes people more willing to work. It is also important to note that in neoliberalism unemployment 
is perceived as a micro-economic problem rather that a macro economic problem and that it is 
caused by market distortions. Thus, when unemployment remained high in the 1980’s, monetarists 
saw it as a consequence of poor job motivation and a lack of incentives to work, resulting from a 
generous social security system – another argument for welfare retrenchment. 
 
3 . 2 . 4  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  S o c i a l  I n v e s t m e n t  P a r a d i g m  
Neoliberalism argued for a diminishing role of welfare state activity, this set of ideals 
however, seemed to worsen societal problems and increase poverty rates all over Europe during the 
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1980’s and beginning of the 1990’s. Thus, resistance to the neoliberal politics and ideas of welfare 
retrenchment generated success for left wing politicians throughout Europe (ibid: 78). This became 
evident with the elections of Gerhard Shröder in Germany, Tony Blair in England, Wim Wok in the 
Netherlands and Poul Nyrup Rasmussen in Denmark (ibid: 46). These politicians represented a new 
wave of political thought in regards of welfare policy, away from the Keynesianist notion that any 
social policy was a good social policy and away from the Neoliberalist notion of welfare 
retrenchment. This new wave of political thought eventually became known as the Social 
Investment Perspective. 
 
Advocates of this new movement were represented amongst institutions like the OECD, but 
also in the EU where the European commission, in 1997 under Dutch presidency, developed its own 
version of the social investment perspective, entitled ‘Social Policy as Productive Factor’. The tenet 
of this perspective was that investment in social policy eventually would lead to a productive factor 
and therefore contribute to the economy (ibid: 36). In 1997 the Asian crises destabilised the 
international economy and international financial institutions due to short term capital flows which 
left countries exposed to great risk (Stiglitz et al, 2010: 169). As a result 
“[...]the Asian crises triggered fundamental reassessment of economic and social policy in 
much of the world outside Europe. In several international organisations it finally became possible 
to question neoliberal analysis” (Morel, Palier & Palme: 79). It thus became evident with the Asian 
Crisis that existing political and economic paradigms were to be challenged once again. 
Even though the crises itself did not affect the social policies in Europe directly it affected 
international organisations like OECD, which functions as a bridge between Europe and Asia. 
“[...]OECD could serve as a conduit for much of the policy puzzling in the post-1997 
assessments of the Asian crises as well as exploring in the European context the contradiction 
between the promises of neoliberalism and its outcomes” (ibid: 79). 
 
Although it can be argued that the social investment perspective is used across various 
institutions and organisations, like the OECD and the EU, it is important to note that the social 
investment perspective is an emerging paradigm. The social investment state perspective has not yet 
been accepted as a “[...] hegemonic new welfare state paradigm on par with Keynesian welfare 
state expansion and neoliberal social retrenchment” (ibid: 33). In addition Morel emphasises that 
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the historical fate of the social welfare state perspective lies in the aftermath of the recent global 
financial crises (ibid: 33). 
 
3 . 2 . 5  1 9 9 0 ’ s  R e t h i n k i n g  S o c i a l  P o l i c i e s  i n  t h e  D a n i s h  W e l f a r e  
S t a t e  
In the period after 1993, Denmark saw economic growth as a result of an increased global 
tendency towards free trade (Mogensen, 2010: 419). Furthermore the EU had seen a wave of 
increased integration, with the establishment of the internal market for free movement of work and 
goods that Denmark participates in. The Danish currency became attached to the Euro with a fixed 
exchange rate to enlighten transaction burdens and remove administrative trade obstacles that 
occurs from trading in different currency, obstacles seen after 1973. Denmark benefitted through 
the period 1993 until 2008 from a 0.3 percent higher growth rate than in period from 1970 until 
1993 (ibid: 419). This was seemingly a good development, however the already quite high Danish 
wages, when compared to the countries that are normally compared to Denmark, rose in the period. 
This tendency was overall bad for the competitiveness of the Danish labour market (ibid: 419).  
 
In the beginning of the 1990’s there was a quite substantial amount of unemployed. To get 
people into the labour market, the then government implemented socalled 'sabbath' and job rotation 
policies which meant that more applicants could be employed in the same position (ibid: 419). In 
the statistics this had a positive effect on the unemployment, but in reality, economists estimate that 
over 100.000 was actually removed from the labour market as a result (ibid: 419). Furthermore the 
possibility for taking child leave and going on early retirement was enhanced in the period which 
resulted in a three percent drop in the labour frequency. The state was financing early retirement 
and other beneficial leave programs in order to improve the employment statistics, but this however 
backfired in the form of higher wages in decreased competitiveness (ibid: 425). 
 
Despite of the negative policies of the 1990's and beginning of the 00's the internationally 
praised Danish 'flexicurity' model was further elaborated into an even more effective model. The 
flexibility enables companies to hire, and especially, fire employees without the fear of having to 
pay unemployment benefits for several years. This enables the companies to adjust the workforce 
according to the economic development. The security side is the very high unemployment 
compensation that a recently fired person can receive, so that unemployment does not become a 
16 
 
personal economic tragedy (ibid: 436- 438). This has thus made Denmark an attractive country to 
invest in despite high wages (ibid: 436-38). During the 1990's and beginning of the 2000's the 
compensation was so high that in 2001 an unemployed industrial worker received approximately 
500 Danish crowns less when unemployed than employed (ibid: 439). This secured the population 
against poverty when unemployed and ensured them the means to enter the labour market once 
again. 
 
3 . 2 . 6  T h e  T u r n  o f  t h e  C e n t u r y  
In 2005, the Danish welfare commission presented a report with the conclusions that 
increased immigration and the demographic development would pose serious burdens for the 
Danish public finances. The report concluded that immigrants, now counting five percent of the 
total Danish population, received approximately 35 percent of social security payments which 
equalled one percent of the Danish GDP (ibid: 507). In 2009, the same commission predicted that 
the increase in Danish citizens older than 60 would pose a very significant threat to the entire 
Danish welfare system and if not addressed in time, would lead to large tax increases and/ or large 
cuts in parts of the public sector (ibid: 507). The commission proposed cuts in the early retirement 
system, by increasing the age at which people could take early retirement. Combined with a 
reduction of the period in which unemployed could receive unemployment benefits to 
approximately half and an increase in private payment of eldercare, the commission predicted that 
the Danish welfare system could evolve without facing the consequences mentioned above (ibid: 
507). The political response to the welfare commissions report was the welfare reports of 2006, 
which intended to gradually increase the early retirement age from 60 to 62 in the period from 2019 
to 2022 and the pension age from 65 to 67 in the period from 2024 to 2027. The unemployment 
benefits were not altered, but the requirements that unemployed had to fulfil to receive the benefits 
were changed in a direction, that the Danish government called more ‘activistic’ (ibid: 508).  
 
3 . 2 . 7  P a r t  C o n c l u s i o n  o f  H i s t o r i c a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  
Towards the end of the 1990's and the beginning of the 00's, the focus shifted in the Danish 
social politics towards what was considered, by the governments which implemented it, a more 
'active' social security system. This meant outfacing the ‘sabbath’- and job rotation systems of the 
early 1990's and the implementation of new up-qualification courses for unemployed, publicly 
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subsidised jobs and less than full time jobs that to some extend also were publicly subsidised 
(ibid:526). The changes came in a period with decreasing unemployment and towards 2008 
problems with the supply of labour on the Danish labour market (ibid: 524). However, large parts of 
the transfer payment system was not changed and the more passive parts of the Danish social 
security system remained intact, which was criticised by economists as a problem that should have 
been addressed (ibid: 524 – 527). An important aspect of the Danish transfer payment system is 
way that the payments are regulated. In the 1990's the payments were regulated according to the 
development of the salary level on the labour market but after 2004 they were regulated according 
to the price development that historically have been lower (ibid: 540). 
 
From the historical development the project can conclude that there have been shifts in the 
way that social and welfare policies have been perceived internationally and in Denmark. There 
have been shifts from the demand side policies of Keynesianism with a focus on a big welfare state 
until the 1970’s to the neoliberal paradigm of the 1980's with emphasis on the supply side and 
welfare retrenchment. The latest development took place in the beginning of the 1990's with the 
development of new social democratic paradigms, where emphasis was put on developing the 
welfare states, not necessarily expanding the public sectors as during the Keynesian period, but 
developing it towards a more economically sustainable state solution. It is during this latest shift in 
mind that the Social Investment Perspective was developed and must be seen. 
 
3 . 3  T h e  S o c i a l  I n v e s t m e n t  P e r s p e c t i v e  
In the Historical Development part 3.2 the development of the welfare state from under the 
influence of first Keynesianism to Neoliberalism and finally of an emerging Social Investment 
Perspective was explained. 
In this chapter the Social Investment Perspective, as presented in the foregoing chapters, will 
be elaborated on. To begin with, this project presents a short comparison between Keynesianism, 
Neoliberalism and the Social Investment Perspective. Secondly, investment oriented policies will be 
defined and finally this leads to an in depth theoretical presentation of the Social Investment 
Perspective. 
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3 . 3 . 1  C o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h e  t h r e e  p a r a d i g m s  
As it was stated in the last chapter, the Social Investment Perspective is an emerging 
paradigm. It has not fully established itself as a paradigm such as Keynesianism or Neoliberalism 
have done. The Social Investment Perspective describes a tendency that is today seen throughout 
both national welfare state regimes and supranational bodies such as the OECD and the EU (Morel, 
Palier & Palme: 79). 
The Social Investment Perspective contains elements from both Keynesianism and 
Neoliberalism and it can thus be regarded as both a development of the two and as an alternative to 
them. 
There are though fundamental differences between Keynesianism, Neoliberalism and the 
Social Investment Perspective. Firstly, the reason for unemployment is in Keynesianism due to 
insufficient demand and slow growth, whereas it in Neoliberalism is due to constraints on labour 
supply caused by labour market rigidities such as high labour costs, too much labour regulation and 
social benefits working as disencentives (ibid: 12). To the Social Investment Perspective, 
unemployment is due to lack of adequate skills and the ‘cure’ is education and training (ibid: 12). 
Secondly, the role of social policy in Keynesianism is perceived as positive. Social insurance, 
it is argued, prop up demand and thus stimulate the economy. Thus, the state is allowed to be ‘big’ 
with central economic planning. Contrarily, in Neoliberalism social policy is perceived as being 
negative (ibid: 12). The welfare state is perceived as being costly and the cause of slow growth and 
inflation (ibid: 12). The state must thus be lean and deregulation and privatisation is advised. In the 
Social Investment Perspective social policy is only positive insofar that it invests in human capital 
in order to increase employment and employability levels; improve flexicurity, that is increase 
support for labour market fluidity and finally to prepare for the ‘knowledge economy’ (ibid: 12). 
The state must therefore be empowering and the focus lies on investment for the future (ibid: 12). 
Thirdly, as was mentioned in the last chapter, the key principles in Keynesianism were social 
equality, jobs for all men and decommodification (ibid: 12), whereas it in Neoliberalism were 
individual responsibility, any jobs, and activation (ibid:  12). In the Social Investment Perspective 
the key principles are social inclusion, quality jobs – not any jobs as in Neoliberalism and 
Keynesianism, and there is an emphasis on ‘preparing rather than repairing’ (ibid: 12). The latter 
can be translated into an emphasis on more activating social policies that prepare for the future 
needs of the society instead of passive and policies. 
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To sum up, the Social Investment Perspective thus has an emphasis on policies that invest in 
human capital in order to increase the competitiveness and the job supply. It further emphasizes the 
need to support the labour market with both social services and policies (ibid: 12), such as early 
childhood education and care, higher education and lifelong training along with active labour 
market policies, women’s employment and finally flexicurity (ibid: 12), some of which will be 
elaborated on later. 
In the following, this project will elaborate on the social policies of the Social Investment 
Perspective. 
 
3 . 3 . 3  S o c i a l  I n v e s t m e n t  P o l i c i e s  
The Social Investment Perspective defines certain policies which can be regarded as social 
investment oriented.  These social policies “are more strongly oriented towards provision for the 
future and the needs of the younger generations” (ibid: 92) - a stand essential to the Social 
Investment Perspective. 
The Social Investment Perspective operates through mainly three policy areas: family policy, 
active labour market policy and education. This project’s focus is primarily on active labour market 
policy, but the other two policy areas are touched upon in order to get a full understanding of the 
Social Investment Perspective. 
Family policy, according to Morel, Palier and Palme embodies a number of policies which 
aim: to keep up the birth rate in order to sustain the population; to ensure that an increasing number 
of women can unite family and work; to reduce child poverty; to promote the development of 
children by early childhood education and care services; and finally to bridge the gap between the 
incomes of men and women (ibid: 92-93). Such an investment increases the workforce and 
heightens competitiveness, while making men and women more equal. 
Active labour market policy “aims to promote labour mobility and the adaptation of citizens 
to changing labour markets” (ibid: 93). These are policies which serve to reintegrate people into the 
labour market instead of passively supporting them (ibid: 93). According to Bent Greve, active 
labour market policies are “[…]used to counteract labour shortage and to mobilize the workforce 
by holding down the overall unemployment level” (2013: 118). 
In contrast to active labour market policy, passive labour market policy is transfer sums used 
to support individuals outside the labour market without enabling their re-entrance to it, whereas 
active labour market policies aim at quite the opposite. Some of the primary purposes of active 
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labour market policies are instead to invest in human capital and through this increase the job 
prospects of the unemployed part of the population. Other types of active labour market policies 
are“[…] training activities through classroom education, training at workplaces, and special 
support for apprenticeships” (ibid: 119). An example of this is the Danish student benefit which is 
an investment in human capital through education, enabling the individuals to later enter the labour 
market. 
As a broader network is also seen as helpful in obtaining a job, another type of active labour 
market policy aim at “[…] promoting an efficient exchange of information between employers and 
employees/unemployed.” (ibid: 119) This is done to encourage the communication between the 
unemployed and the employers. In Table 3.1 four types of labour market policy is described. The 
table makes it clear what is important to the Social Investment Perspective. Passive benefits are 
regarded as being absent of investment in re-entry into the labour market called ‘Promarket 
employment orientation’ in the table. Passive benefits are furthermore regarded as weak in their 
orientation towards investment in human capital. Passive labour market policies are thus not 
favoured by the Social Investment Perspective if they are the only or primary labour market 
policies, whereas active labour market policies as described are deemed essential to the theory 
(ibid). It is though very important to note that passive benefits used in the right combination with 
active benefits creates a very strong fundament for a social investment welfare state. 
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Education is also crucial to the Social Investment Perspective since it is the “[…] key force in 
human capital development […]” and as it is the “[…] main public investment that can foster both 
economic and civic cohesion” (Morel, Palier & Palme, 2012: 93). This is due to the shift to a more 
‘knowledgebased economy’ (ibid), where physical capital such as machinery and equipment along 
with manual labour power no longer exist as the primary factors in wealth accumulation. Instead, 
there is an ever growing need for skills that can deal with information and the production of it 
(ibid). In such an economy it is thus obvious that education becomes a huge competitive factor 
22 
 
(ibid). Furthermore it is argued that due to increases in life-expectancy and knowledge becoming 
outdated increasingly fast, education becomes ever more important to accommodate the need of the 
future (ibid). 
This means that education both for young and adults is crucial. The young should have the 
possibility of taking an education, whereas people both on and especially out of the labour market 
also should have the possibility of up-skilling, thus enabling them to re-enter it and qualify to a 
different job in another trade. 
 
3 . 3 . 4  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  S o c i a l  R i g h t s  &  D u t i e s  a n d  G o v e r n a n c e  
In the following it is presented how the Social Investment Perspective views responsibilities, 
social rights and duties and governance of both citizens and state. 
In the Social Investment Perspective the responsibility for wellbeing is placed upon the 
market, the family, the state and the community. These different actors support each other to 
accomplish the common goal of achieving wellbeing (ibid: 69). It is argued that as the market 
cannot provide sufficiently for all it is thus necessary to complement it (ibid: 69). The family has 
primary responsibility for the children in the Social Investment Perspective, but the state has 
responsibility on this area too. The state has furthermore responsibility to invest in areas such as the 
previously mentioned human capital in order to support labour market participation and to prevent 
against social risks and poverty. Finally both the family and the community “are called upon to 
‘invest their own human capital’” (ibid: 69), this implicates that the community is a potential 
partner in the provision of services and that the Social Investment Perspective incites people to 
participate, that is to be willing to take an education or be up-skilled and be available to the labour 
market. 
The Social goals of the Social Investment Perspective are to invest in prevention and human 
capital. This is done in order to obtain growth and prosperity. Furthermore the view on equality is to 
obtain equality of opportunity, which is implied in the Social Investments Perspective’s focus on 
family policy, active labour market policy and education mentioned above (ibid) 
In the Social Investment Perspective there is greater emphasis on the rights and duties of 
citizenship than in Neoliberalism. Whereas many of the rights and duties were tried dismantled in 
Neoliberalism, the Social Investment Perspective reintroduces and elaborates on them (ibid).  Thus 
in the Social Investment Perspective citizen’s duties with respect to the labour market is to be 
willing to work. They are not left to themselves or to the fluctuations of the market if they lose their 
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income, instead they have the right to have sufficient income if they are so unfortunate the market 
does not provide – a fundamental pillar of the Social Investment Perspective and a stark contrast to 
Neoliberalism which argue for “a maximum of independence and self-reliance” implying that 
people should provide for themselves and not rely on the state to do it for them (ibid: 71-73). In the 
Social Investment Perspective, this also implicates that for people, who do not have sufficient 
income or are in need of entering employment and when the market fails to provide services at an 
affordable price, there must be established publicly funded services (ibid: 72). 
Whereas Keynesianism was influenced by the Weberian way of governing, with a hierarchical 
and bureaucratic structure, Neoliberalism had a greater focus on a corporate like structure along 
with privatisation. This latter idea manifested itself through New Public Management, which 
surfaced to make the state apparatus more efficient – an instrument that the Social Investment 
Perspective also embraces (ibid: 76). In the Social Investment Perspective there is a greater 
emphasis on networking and partnerships in order for communication and involvement to be 
increasingly local (ibid: 76). Intermediary groups are thus in the Social Investment Perspective a 
sign of an “organised expression of social needs and solidarity that requires public investment to 
build its capacity for partnerships” (ibid: 75), implying that one as government should listen to 
these groups in order to make democratic policy. 
In Keynesianism results were measured as amounts of spending, in Neoliberalism the focus 
rests instead on costs, while it in the Social Investment Perspective is on outcomes. 
Whereas the private sector was only perceived as being wealth creating in Keynesianism, it 
was in Neoliberalism perceived as a model for wealth creation and regulation. In the Social 
Investment Perspective it is perceived as wealth creating partner and a model for regulation (ibid: 
75). 
 
3 . 3 . 5  P a r t  c o n c l u s i o n  
The Social Investment Perspective is an emerging paradigm. It was stated previously that the 
Social Investment Perspective contains elements of both Keynesianism and Neoliberalism and can 
thus be regarded as both a development and an alternative to the two. Fundamental differences 
distinguish the Social Investment Perspective from Keynesianism and Neoliberalism. The Social 
Investment Perspective considers unemployment as being the cause of the lack of adequate skills 
and it is therefore necessary to educate and up-skill people in order for them to enter or re-enter the 
labour market. Moreover, social policy is considered positive insofar that the policies prepare 
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people for the labour market and there is thus a need for an ‘empowering’ state. Because of the 
Social Investment Perspective’s focus on the supply side of the economy and of social policy, it is 
natural to speak of investments instead of expenditure or spending. Investment therefore means an 
increased focus on ‘preparing rather than repairing’ – a key principle of the Social Investment 
Perspective. The Social Investment Perspective thus emphasises policies such as early childhood 
education and care, higher education and lifelong training along with active labour market policies, 
women’s employment and finally ‘flexicurity’, by which is meant policies which invest in human 
capital in order to increase competitiveness and the job supply and to support the labour market. 
Active labour market policy is especially important to this project. These are policies which 
serve to reintegrate people into the labour market instead of passively supporting them. They are 
policies that support people economically who for example momentarily lose their jobs. This form 
of security makes the workforce flexible and it is commonly referred to as the ‘flexicurity’ model. 
In the Social Investment Perspective the responsibility for wellbeing is placed upon the 
market, the family, the state and the community. Whereas the responsibility of generating wealth is 
still placed on the market it is necessary in the Social Investment Perspective that ‘work must pay’, 
that people must have equal opportunities and both the family and the community ‘are called upon 
to invest their own human capital’, in which is implied that people as a duty should be willing to 
work, but that they also by right should be protected against market fluctuations and loss of income. 
Finally, there is also a greater emphasis on networking and partnerships in order for communication 
and involvement to be increasingly local. 
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C h a p t e r  4  
E m p i r i c a l  D a t a  
In the previous chapter the historical development and the theoretical framework was 
elaborated on. This chapter will now describe the empirical data which lay the foundation for the 
analysis. The chapter will present reform changes on unemployment benefits, social security, early 
retirement benefit, state pension and disability pension within the given time frame. The chapter 
will also include statistics to better understand the development in the given areas. The chapter will 
not try to analyse the statistical development in the different areas, however there will be comments 
where it is deemed necessary. The reform changes presented in the following will then be analysed 
in chapter 5. 
 
4 . 1  U n e m p l o y m e n t  B e n e f i t  
When this project is referring to unemployment benefits, it is referring to the Danish 
unemployment benefits system which is partly managed through the organisation of the workforce 
in unions and unemployment insurance funds. 
The level of unemployment benefit is related to the Danish flexicurity system that enables 
employers to hire and fire (Andersen & Svarer 2006). The high security of the employees thus 
ensures flexibility for the employers. 
To receive unemployment benefits citizens must be a member of either a union that offers 
unemployment insurance or an unemployment insurance fund (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2013c). 
Furthermore, the recipient must be unemployed due to non self-inflicted reasons (ibid). Citizensl 
can only in special cases qualify for unemployment benefits if the job was quitted (ibid). To qualify 
for unemployment benefits citizens must also have worked for 1924 hours or more within the last 
three years as of 2011 (ibid). Furthermore, the recipient of unemployment benefits must be 
available to the labour market, through active job seeking and/ or participate in up- skilling courses 
(ibid). 
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From the above graph it can be seen that there has been a general decrease in the number of 
recipients of unemployment benefits. The decrease might be connected to reforms of the period, but 
could also have been influenced by external factors like economic up- and downswings of the 
period.  
 
In 1993, a reform was implemented with the purpose of setting a limit on the time one could 
receive unemployment benefits to seven years. In addition the right to regain unemployment 
benefits was set to 26 weeks of labour market activity (Arbejdsministeriet, 1999: 17). These 
changes did not become effective before 1994 and the change might have influenced the slope of 
the graph as the total amount of individuals receiving unemployment benefits decreases from 
approximately 264.000 from 1994 and onwards. The influence of the reform on the graph, if any, 
might have been due to people falling out of the unemployment system because of the new time 
limit set on unemployment benefits. 
The reform also provided the means for unemployed to receive up-skilling or education while 
receiving unemployment benefits. Ultimately, the hope was that individuals were less likely to fall 
back into receiving unemployment benefits (ibid: 14-15). This system explicitly added a ‘right’ but 
also a demand for recipients to participate in activation programs (Isaksen, Mikkelsen & 
Nellemann, 2012: 76). 
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The reform also added the requirement that recipients should be increasingly mobile, and 
thereby be willing to accept a daily transport time by up to three hours in order to get to work 
(Retsinformation,2012). 
 
In 1996, the labour market activity requirement set to 26 weeks in 1993 was increased to 52 
weeks (Arbejdsministeriet, 1999: 17). In addition, the eligibility period for unemployment benefits 
was reduced by one year. This, accompanied by the changed labour market activity period meant 
that additional individuals fell out of the unemployment benefit service, and that it therefore also 
possibly affected the graph’s downward moving slope. After the reform, the eligibility period 
consisted of three passive years and three activation years (Andersen & Svarer 2006). 
In addition, this reform implemented mandatory education for unemployed under 25, and 
economic sanctions if a recipient refused to participate in activation programs. This might mean that 
fewer individuals would fall back to unemployment benefit services as more eventually would end 
up with better qualifications than previously increasing their chances of finding a job (Isaksen, 
Mikkelsen & Nellemann, 2012: 76- 77). 
  
Another reform was made in 1997 and implemented in 1998. This required recipients to be 
increasingly mobile, so that recipients under special circumstances should be willing to accept a 
transport time, by up to a total of four hours to work (Retsinformation, 2012).  
This reform also meant that recipients could be refused further education if there were 
suitable jobs available within this specific area (Arbejdsministeriet, 1999: 17).  
The reform further reduced the eligibility period for the unemployment service by one 
additional passive year. Recipients would now have the right and duty to receive an activation 
period, if they have been unemployed for two years. The total period would then consist of two 
passive years and three activation years. These changes to the unemployment benefit service might 
have affected the graph’s continuing tendency of sloping downwards (Andersen & Svarer 2006).   
 
In 1999, the unemployment benefits system was further reformed. The eligibility period were 
slightly reduced again so the recipient now had the right and duty to attend activation courses after 
one year and nine months of unemployment. In total, the period recipients were able to receive 
unemployment benefits, now consisted of a four year and nine months period consisting of one year 
and nine months passive benefits and three activation years. In addition, unemployed were obliged 
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to accept any meaningful job after three months of unemployment (Arbejdsministeriet, 1999: 18-
19).  Much like the previous reforms, these changes might have contributed to the slope’s slight 
downward trend. 
 
In 2000 and 2001, the eligibility period was changed two times ending up with a one year 
passive period and a three year activation period and finally in 2003 the passive period was 
completely removed, meaning the obligation for recipients to accept offers of training and up-
skilling now applied from the first day of unemployment. In addition, unemployed now had the 
right and duty to activation after 12 months of unemployment, and from this point every six 
months. Recipients under the age of 30 have the right and duty to receive and take part in the first 
offer of activation within the first six months (Andersen & Svarer 2006).  These changes would in 
regard to the reforms implemented at the time, indicate that fewer people would enter the 
unemployment benefit system. However, as additional people entered the system in this period, the 
reforms fail to explain the slopes upward movement. Instead it must be regarded that other factors 
have had an effect on the slopes development 
The 2003 reform also required unemployed to register their resume in the national job register 
within a month of their unemployment (Finansministeriet, 2009). 
 
In 2006, recipients who had received unemployment benefits for more than two and a half 
years were entailed to be enrolled full time in the activation and up-qualification programs available 
(ibid). 
 
In 2009, the unemployment system was streamlined with a number of adjustments moving 
governmental tasks to the municipalities with the intent of creating a more generalised directory for 
dealing with unemployed. This was done in order to increase the effectiveness in dealing with the 
recipients (ibid). 
 
In 2011, another reform took place. This time the eligibility period for unemployment benefits 
was cut into half, so the period would now entail two years with activation, up-skilling and training 
instead of four (AK-Samvirke. 2011). This change would allow fewer to remain in the 
unemployment benefit system. Consequently, if not being able to find a job within the period 
recipients would be transferred to the social security system if qualifying for social security. 
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The commission that worked out the latest reform which became effective in 2011, 
anticipated that keeping the unemployment benefit service as it were, with its focus on activation 
for recipients, would not aid in reducing the unemployment further. 
“The consequence of the existing rules on unemployment benefits is that a number of 
unemployed is staying unnecessarily long in the unemployment benefit system and considerable 
resources are used in the active employment initiatives to prevent it“ (Arbejdsmarkedskommisionen 
2009)1. 
Instead the commission proposed a reduction of the eligibility period if a further reduction of 
unemployment was desired, in that it would add an incitement for recipients to get a job, instead of 
being transferred to the social security system after the eligibility period has ended. 
 
4 . 2  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y  
When this project refers to social security it is referring to the transfer payment Danish 
citizens can receive from they turn 18 if they are unable to support their family. The payment can be 
granted only if citizens have no savings to live by or property to sell or have no spouse that can 
provide for them (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2013b). The payment can be granted on the basis of 
long term unemployment, illness or changes in the marital situation of the citizen (ibid). 
Certain requirements are demanded of the recipients of social security. If the recipient 
receives social security because of long term unemployment the recipient has to be available to the 
labour market and report to interviews by the local administration and be actively job seeking (ibid). 
The recipients also have to accept any jobs which match their skill level (ibid). If the recipient does 
not have the required skills to fulfil a meaningful job, the recipient is obliged to participate in up-
skilling courses made available by the local municipality (ibid). This project refers to exactly this 
payment when it mentions social security payment. 
 
1
 “Konsekvensen af de nuværende dagpengeregler er, at nogle ledige opholder sig unødigt længe I dagpengesystemet, og der 
anvendes betydelige ressourcer I den aktive beskæftigelsesindsats på at modvirke det “(Arbejdsmarkedskommisionen 2009) 
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As with the unemployment benefits the development in the number of recipients of the social 
security system cannot solely be explained by reform changes, instead it also relies on other 
indicators such as the economic development. However, reforms can help in explaining some 
development in the service.  
Firstly, it is important to note that social security is closely related to the other transfer 
payment services. For example, when more individual’s fall out of the unemployment benefit 
system they will receive social security if qualifying for this social benefit. The development of the 
slope might thus be affected not only by the reforms of the social security system, but also the 
reformation of other transfer payment areas as social security is the most basic form of transfer 
payment. 
The first change to the social security system happened in 1998, where recipients were 
subjected to a more thorough judgment on their ability to work. The idea was to help recipients 
within the social security system with the aim of getting them into the labour market 
(Finansministeriet, 2009). This change might be seen in the slightly upwards going slope on the 
graph. It is important to note that there were also reforms of the unemployment benefit system in 
this period that might have caused citizens to move from unemployment benefits to social security 
benefits. 
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In 2002, the ‘start help’ was added to the social security system. Essentially, it was a lower 
social security payment for individuals who had lived in Denmark for seven years or less (ibid).  
Additionally, in 2003 social security payments for married couples were lowered and a for 
citizens having received social security for six months a limit was put on the monthly payment 
(ibid). Furthermore, the social security payments were reduced to the level of the student benefit for 
recipients under the age of 25 (ibid). 
Finally the government implemented a subsidy for companies who employed married citizens 
with a reduced ability to work. 
 
In 2005, a requirement for married couples receiving social security was added. It meant that 
married couples combined must have a total of 300 hours of unsubsidized labour market activity 
within the last 24 months in order to continue receiving social security (ibid). In addition, the 
municipalities were rewarded if they actively tried to assist recipients of social security to re-enter 
the labour market (ibid). Lastly, this reform included reactivation programs for recipients, aged 30 
or older, receiving social security (ibid). 
These changes increase the incentive as well as the possibility for the municipalities to aid 
recipients re-entrance on the labour market, this would also entail the slope to decrease slightly due 
more resources being used on getting recipients into the labour market (ibid). 
 
In 2011 the new Social Democratic government removed the start- help and made the social 
security system universal for all who fulfilled the requirements (Ritzau, 2011). 
 
 
4 . 3  E a r l y  R e t i r e m e n t  B e n e f i t  
Early retirement benefit enables citizens to take partial or complete early retirement, provided 
that they fulfil certain requirements. It is required that applicants have been a member of an 
unemployment fund for a minimum of 30 years and they must furthermore have been a member 
before turning 30 years of age (BUPL, 2011). Moreover, at the time they wish to receive early 
retirement benefit, they must be a member of an unemployment fund and have residence in 
Denmark or another European Economic Area-country or Switzerland (ibid). 
As citizens are granted early retirement benefit, they can take complete early retirement or 
still choose to work part time. 
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The size of the monthly payments recipients receive depends on when they took early 
retirement, their pensions and how much they are working.  Full-time insured recipients born before 
1956 can receive a maximum of 3.940 DKK per week. Recipients born after 1956 can receive a 
maximum of 4.005 DKK per week.  Part-time insured recipients born before 1956, can receive a 
maximum of 2.625 DKK per week and recipients born after 1956 a maximum of 2.670 DKK per 
week (Styrelsen for Fastholdelse og Rekruttering, 2013). 
 
The first major change in the slope is between 1994 and 1995 where the amount of recipients 
increases by approximately 33.000. This is partly due to transitional allowances being merged with 
early retirement (Danmarks Statistik, 2013). 
The first reform changes to the early retirement service within the given timeframe happened 
in 1999. This reform reduced the early retirement benefits for recipients who took early retirement 
before they turned 62.  It also sought to implement incentives for later retirement including an 
increased tax allowance if a citizen decided to stay on the labour market after turning 62. 
(Jørgensen, 2009: 9). In this period citizens were able to enter the early retirement benefit service at 
the age of 60 and had 5 years of early retirement. 
Another reform in 2006 sought to gradually increase the age limit for early retirement as well 
as the retirement age (Finansministeriet, 2009). This reform was however later substituted with the 
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latest reform in 2011. This reform meant that the incentives for going on early retirement were 
reduced (AAK, 2013). 
The oldest citizens, that is, those who were born before first January 1954 will not be affected 
by the reform, however, citizens who are born after first January 1954 will be and generally have to 
wait additional years until being able to enter the early retirement system. The changes will result in 
citizens having to wait until the age of 64 to get early retirement benefits, as well as a reduced 
period of three years of unemployment benefits. Finally, the reform meant that the early retirement 
benefit would be lowered progressively in accordance with the recipient’s private pensions 
(Finansministeriet, 2013). 
 
4 . 4  P e n s i o n s  
 
When pensions are mentioned in this project they refer to the state pension that all Danish 
citizens over 65 or 67, depending on the year the citizen was born, can claim. There are certain 
requirements citizens must fulfil, such having a valid citizenship and having lived a minimum of 
three years in Denmark since the age of 15 (Udbetaling Danmark, 2013). Citizen must not have 
other sources of income in order to receive state pension, otherwise the state pension will be 
regulated accordingly or not granted at all (ibid). Since private pensions also play a role in the 
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Danish welfare system it may be necessary to mention them in this project, but these will always be 
referred to as ‘private savings’ or ‘private pensions’, thus the term ‘pensions’ solely refers to state 
pensions. 
 
 
The number of recipients receiving state pensions is generally not decreasing nor increasing in 
the period 1993-2003, instead it can be explained by the changing demographics. As the number of 
elderly people in Denmark has increased since 2003 and can increase in the upcoming years, more 
people can be expected to enter the State Pension service.  
 
 
The population pyramid shows the development of the population. It can be seen that there 
are a lot of individuals on the labour market who is about to reach the retirement age. This can 
explain the increase in individuals who enters the state pension system.  
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In 1994 the state pension system was reformed to ensure a general higher level of public 
pensions, but also a more progressive compensation for other sources of income or savings 
(Jørgensen, 2009: 26).  
In 2003 the ‘elder-check’ was introduced as a public subsidy for recipients who had no other 
income than the state pension (Ældresagen, 2009).  
In 2004 an additional change was implemented to the service, this change would ensure a 
higher state pension the first ten years (ibid). These reform changes will most likely not directly 
affect the number of recipients of state pension. 
 
In 2011, the latest reform passed. This reform steadily increases the retirement age, depending 
on when one is born. The retirement age of 65 is going to increase by half a year per year from 2019 
until 2022, ending with a retirement age of 67 (AAK 2013). 
 
4 . 5  D i s a b i l i t y  P e n s i o n s  
The disability pension system was not reformed between 1993 and 2000/2001. Before 
2000/2001 the disability pension was granted to citizens who for health reason had a reduced ability 
to work equalling 50 percent of normal work ability. The pension had four different payments 
dependent on how reduced ability to work the individual had. Along with the disability pension it 
was possible to receive further support for residence, cleaning and help equipment. The pension 
could be granted for life or for a shorter period whereafter the recipient had to be re- evaluated (Den 
Store Danske, 2013; Finansministeriet, 2013).  
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The 2000/2001 reform disbanded the system with four different levels of disability pensions 
and replaced it with a single universal level that generally increased the amount paid in disability 
pensions. However, the system also disbanded the extra economic support that a disability pension 
recipient could apply for and replaced it with the possibility to deduct expenses for help with a 
persons disability if the expense was above 6000 DKK (Finansministeriet, 2013). Furthermore the 
reform introduced a higher limit on how reduced an ability to work an individual should have 
before being able to apply for a disability pension. Prior to the reform the limit was 50 percent, but 
with the reform it was raised to 75 percent. That was made in combination with an increased 
government support for part time jobs with government subsidisation. The reform also changed the 
evaluation system, so everyone applying for a disability pension would be put through an 
individually designed program to test and evaluate the applicant's ability to work (ibid).  
 
In 2012, the disability pension system was further reformed with the addition of so called 
'resource programs' lasting from one to five years, for every applicant of disability pension. The 
purpose of the resource programs was to make an individual program that ensured that the applicant 
can develop his or hers personal resources and find a part time job if able to possess such. The 
reform has made it impossible for citizens under 40 years of age to be granted permanent disability 
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pension. The reform intends to re- evaluated every recipient of disability pensions that was granted 
a disability pension before turning 40. The reform increased the support for publicly subsidised jobs 
and made it possible for individuals who gets fired from a part time job to receive a compensation 
that is 91 percent of unemployment benefits, while having the right for another resource program 
meant for up qualification (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2012). 
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C h a p t e r  5  
A n a l y s i s  
5 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
The previous chapter has described the reform development on the different labour market 
areas from 1993 to 2012 and has also given an overview of the statistical changes within the given 
areas. This chapter will utilise the empirical data from the previous chapter and investigate in depth 
the reform changes and analyse how these relate to the Social Investment Perspective. It will 
discuss whether the reforms can be considered a move for Denmark towards the Social Investment 
Perspective. 
 
5 . 2  U n e m p l o y m e n t  B e n e f i t  
In 1993, the social democratic government passed the first of three major labour market 
reforms of the 1990's. It had the clear intention of moving citizens from passive incomes back onto 
the labour market. Several of these initiatives were related to an active labour market policy or 
educational policy in that they actively sought to enable people’s re-entrance to the labour market 
by offering and demanding participation in activation courses or re- and up-skilling which 
correspond well with the theoretical ideal of the Social Investment Perspective (Morel, Palier & 
Palme: 2012: 185). In Denmark recipients are by law required to attend activation in order to 
receive unemployment benefits. This means that recipients have to prove that he or she is looking 
for a job. Occasionally it is required that recipients attend job seeking courses every day at job-
centres (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2013c). The activation course may also include job training and 
preparation. 
The reform also implemented a limit on how many years an unemployed could receive 
unemployment benefits. The limit was set to seven years. This is not a positive development in the 
Social Investment Perspective as the unemployement benefits should help citizens re- enter the 
labour market while helping them sustain a fair living and avoid poverty. A limit on this support 
means that citizens now depend more on the labour market and economic developments to create a 
job within seven years. It can be discussed that seven years are a fairly long period, and if a 
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recipient cannot find a job within seven years, the recipient should consider trying to up- qualify or 
educate him or herself. 
It is worth noting that a citizen now had to spend 26 weeks on the labour market in order to 
regain the right to unemployment benefits. This can be considered a conditionality that prevents 
some people from regaining the right to unemployment benefits. 
 
The 1995 reform brought forth further initiatives that from a Social Investment Perspective 
could be deemed positive. The mandatory education for recipients under 25 with little or no 
previous education is a clear, positive step when considering the theoretical framework as it will 
provide young unemployed with competences which hopefully will qualify them for jobs, 
previously unavailable to them and thus reintroduce them to the labour market (Morel, Palier & 
Palme: 2012: 184). 
 
The unemployment reform of 1995 meant an increase from 26 to 52 weeks in the amount of 
time a person had to be employed in order to regain the right for unemployment benefits 
(Beskæftigelsesministeriet: 2013c). This is in itself problematic since unemployment benefits 
should be universally available according to the Social Investment Perspective, and not dependent 
on the timeframe of a job or companies going bankrupt before an employee is able to accumulate 52 
weeks of working (Morel, Palier & Palme: 2012: 72). The requirement of working a certain amount 
of time before regaining the right for unemployment benefits can therefore be deemed a 
‘conditionality’ considered negative in the theoretical framework. 
It can be discussed why the Danish government would implement such an initiative. To try to 
understand why the Danish government might have implemented it, one should look at the 
unemployment rate that had decreased from nearly 12 percent in 1993 to about 8 percent in 1996 
when the reform was finally passed (Danmarks Statistik: 2013). The initiative could therefore be 
considered an attempt to adjust the labour according to the economic situation and predictions. 
Nonetheles, the fundamentals of having a conditionality for receiving unemployment benefits is still 
negative according to the Social Investment State. 
It must further be noted that in correspondence with the theoretical framework, publicly 
funded services such as unemployment benefits should be granted to people who need them. It can 
thus be argued that if there were jobs to take it would not be necessary to implement such initiatives 
(Morel, Palier & Palme: 2012: 72). 
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The changes made in 1997-1998 challenges the principles of rights and duties of the citizen. 
As described in chapter 3 the citizens must be willing to invest their human capital in the labour 
market, thus accepting a fair job that allows the citizen to support for him- or herself. With the 
change of the reform of 1997-1998 that made it a requirement for an unemployed to accept a job 
within a total of four hours of his or hers residence, the Danish government challenged the limits for 
what an acceptable investment in the labour market is for a citizen. That is, they challenged the 
citizen’s rights. Family obligations with children etc. might not make it possible for a citizen to 
accept that many hours of transportation. Hypothetically, it means that a family have to relocate to 
sustain their living. The Social Investment Perspective states that a citizen must be willing to invest 
his- or hers human capital, but it is unclear to what extent. The increased transport time to work thus 
lies in a grey zone. Whether it is a fair duty of the citizen rests in the interpretation of the theory. It 
can be fair to require some citizens to be more mobile while it may not be fair to other citizens 
where certain considerations may be taken into account. 
The reform further emphasised the duties of the citizen by making it possible to refuse a 
recipient of unemployment benefits further education if a fair job matching the citizen’s 
qualifications exists. The citizen can still take an education if he does not have one, however this 
will be under the formal educational system. This part of the reform relates itself well with the 
Social Investment Perspective. It is a citizen’s right to work if there exists fair work that can sustain 
the current life of the citizen. It should not be possible for people to maintain themselves in the 
unemployment benefits system if there are jobs for them to possess (ibid: 66-8). 
 
In 1999, the unemployment system was reformed in what is both a positive and negative 
direction from a Social Investment Perspective. The period in which a recipient could receive 
unemployment benefits was reduced from seven to four years. This is not a step in the right 
direction when considering the Social Investment Perspective, as unemployment benefits should 
support unemployed and enable them to re-enter the labour market through active labour market 
policies (ibid: 185). Cutting down the unemployment benefit is problematic, since the benefit 
should support unemployed as long as they cannot re-enter the labour market, which they are meant 
to do through active labour market policies and education. It can thus be argued, the reform may 
make it increasingly difficult for unemployed to re-enter the labour market. 
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The reform further reduced the period in which recipients could passively receive 
unemployment benefit from two to one year. This is well in line with the Social Investment 
Perspective. It is because of the balancing between passive and active benefits. A passive benefit is 
not good on its own, but complemented by active benefits makes a very effective social policy 
(ibid: 110). Combining the two forms of labour market policies creates a more focused and 
comprehensive system in that it both allows for the economic support of the recipient and helps the 
recipient get back onto the labour market through activation. 
 
The 2003 adjustment can be considered a step in the right direction. Firstly, it may help 
recipients to faster re-enter the labour market. The adjustment made it a requirement for recipients 
to hand in their resumées within one month of being unemployed, thus enabling them to return to 
labour market quicker if jobs are available. Secondly, the adjustment meant that the period  
recipient passively could receive unemployment benefits was completely removed. This meant that 
recipients were now required to participate in activation programs from the day they were granted 
unemployment benefits. This is positive when considering the Social Investment Perspective due to 
the tight combination of passive and active benefits. It can though be discussed whether citizens 
should have the opportunity to find a job without having to participate in mandatory activation 
courses. It can be considered a government interference in citizen’s right of finding a job that suits 
that citizen. Considering the rights of the citizen having a timeframe where citizens themselves 
might find a job may have been a more fair solution. 
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The 2006 reform, meant to target long time unemployed, introduced mandatory full time 
activation for the last one and a half year of the unemployment benefit period. This is a debatable 
initiative as meaningful activation is considered positive in the Social Investment Perspective (ibid: 
185). However, making the activation period mandatory is to demand more of the recipients without 
increasing their rights. The Social Investment Perspective is all about balancing the two. 
The latest reform of the unemployment benefits system was implemented in 2011. Firstly, it 
reduced the time-frame for receiving unemployment benefits from four to two years. Secondly, it 
increased the required labour market activity to regain the right for unemployment benefits from a 
half year to one. The latter can be considered a conditionality in the theoretical framework as it 
makes it increasingly difficult for citizens to regain unemployment benefits. The former is a major 
setback, when analysing from a Social Investment Perspective, as it reduces the rights of citizens 
without the introduction of new ones (ibid: 66-8). It is also very problematic to cut publicly funded 
benefits as these types of benefits lay the foundation for the ‘flexicurity’ model described in chapter 
three as the security of the citizens enable the labour market’s flexibility. Due to the decrease in 
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security it can therefore be argued that such a cut in the unemployment benefit period may actually 
make the labour market less flexible. The 2011 reform can thus be considered the least compatible 
with the Social Investment Perspective as it makes the unemployment benefit a less universal 
service and as it halves one of the fundamental elements of the Social Investment Perspective. 
 
5 . 2 . 1  P a r t  C o n c l u s i o n  
The development of the unemployment system took a somewhat positive turn in the 1990's 
with more focus on balancing the active and passive parts of the system. The introduction of 
mandatory activation after a certain period can be seen as a fair and thus positive development in 
the Social Investment Perspective. Certain other aspects such as mandatory education for the 
youngest recipients of unemployment benefits and the requirement that recipients make themselves 
available to the labour market are all positive developments. 
However, most of the reform changes in unemployment benefits passed during the 1990’s 
were in a direction where they generally reduced the rights of the citizen's without adding new 
initiatives. This development continued into the 00's where the unemployment benefits period was 
cut to two years. This development additionally reduced citizens right for unemployment insurance, 
which is problematic as new rights or new initiatives was not introduced instead, but also very 
problematic since it challenged the flexicurity system advocated strongly by the Social Investment 
Perspective. Thereby the latest development can be seen as a major setback. 
 
5 . 3  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y  
The 1998 reform of the social security system meant a more thorough analysis of the 
recipient’s ability to work. It is very much in line with the ideas of the Social Investment 
Perspective, since everybody who is able to work has a duty to do so (ibid: 66-8). 
In 2002, it was added that immigrants and others who had lived less than seven years in 
Denmark received a lesser amount of social security payments. This is not a step towards social 
investment, since people who are able to work, but cannot find work should be educated or up-
skilled, as is a duty while receiving social security, to the extend where they can get a meaningful 
job while receiving a government support. Hereby, they will have the resources to sustain a fair 
living and thus have the minimal resources to sustain a family. 
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The 2003 reform lowered payment for married citizens and put a limit on the social security 
payments after six month. These additions are counterproductive, as people should be able to 
sustain a purposeful living so they can take an education and enter the labour market (ibid: 226). It 
was thus a step away from the Social Investment Perspective in this part of the reform does not 
secure universal rights 
There were however positive initiatives in the reform. For instance, the reform increased 
government subsidising of companies hiring a married person with the inability to work full time on 
part time. This is positive considering the Social Investment Perspective as everybody who can 
work should work, according to the theory, even if they can only work part time (ibid: 69). 
 
The 2005 reform put forth a further conditionality for married couples in that they must have 
a combined 300 hours of labour market activity which equals to approximately eight weeks of full 
time employment within 24 months before being granted the opportunity for social security 
benefits. Conditionalities are generally considered negative in the Social Investment Perspective as 
they prevent some people from receiving social benefits (ibid: 12). However, it is debatable to what 
degree this conditionality prevents people from receiving social security. Some citizens may not be 
able to meet the requirement of having worked 300 hours, while others certainly will. 
The reform also granted larger economic support to municipalities which actively tried to 
make recipients of social security benefits reenter the labour market. There was no definition of 
'actively' in the reform review however (Jørgensen, 2009: 127). The idea behind this initiative is 
something very much in line with the Social Investment Perspective, namely to make an active 
effort in moving people who are able to work, from transfer payments and back onto the labour 
market. However, without a clear definition of the 'actively' part of the reform it is difficult to tell 
whether it is actually a step in the Social Investment Perspective direction. The last initiative from 
the 2005 reform was the reactivation programs for recipients of social security above 30 years of 
age. This initiative is well in line with the fundamentals of the theory since it tries to re-educate or 
up-qualify recipients of transfer payments so they can re-enter the labour market faster (ibid: 185). 
 
The 2006 adjustment of the social security system was relatively small. It added the 
requirement of visiting the national job bank once a week which can be regarded as a positive 
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development (Jørgensen, 2009). This requirement might be regarded as a conditionality, but should 
instead be considered an element of an active labour market policy (ibid, 2012). 
Further adjustments were made in 2008 following an EU ruling that made it easier for 
immigrants to enter Denmark. The adjustments included on the social security area an increase in 
the labour market activity requirement of 2003 from 300 combined hours to 450. It is however still 
a step in the wrong direction as it serves as a conditionality for receiving unemployment benefits 
which is negative (Finansministeriet, 2009). 
 
The 2011 dismantling of the start help must be seen as a positive development in that it makes 
the social security benefit universal again. 
 
 
5 . 3 . 1  P a r t  C o n c l u s i o n  
The development on the social security system has over the time frame presented included 
both some positive and negative elements. 
Some positive initiatives has been a more thorough analysis of the recipients ability to work 
and the requirement for recipients to be available to the labour market by actively being job- 
seeking. However, the development has as mentioned also included negative elements, such as the 
labour market activity requirements, which are to be considered a conditionality. This is not in line 
with the ideas of a universal social security system, advocated for by the Social Investment 
Perspective, as it prevents some citizens from receiving this basic social service. The introduction of 
the start- help was also negative in a Social Investment Perspective context, however the disbanding 
the start help obviously makes the system universal again and was therefore a positive change. 
Overall the social security system has been developed in a direction which is mainly in accordance 
with the ideas of the Social Investment Perspective. 
 
5 . 4  E a r l y  R e t i r e m e n t  B e n e f i t  
Early retirement benefits are as a whole considered negative in the Social Investment 
Perspective. Where unemployment benefit and social security can be regarded as temporary social 
benefits meant to aid recipients in regaining their position on the labour market, early retirement 
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benefit is a permanent social benefit meant for citizens who withdraw from the labour market. To 
grant citizens who are able to work the possibility of going on early retirement is to withdraw their 
work duty and passively support them. This must be seen in combination with transfer income 
solutions for citizens who are not able to work and therefore need to retire earlier for various 
reasons. 
 
The early retirement benefit reform of 1999 tried to improve the system from a Social 
Investment Perspective standpoint. It was done by reducing the payments for recipients who took 
early retirement before they turned 62 and by giving tax allowances to those who waited until after 
they had turned 62. This is fundamentally a good initiative that was intended to provide an incentive 
for leaving the labour market later than some might otherwise have done. It does not, however, 
challenge the fact that citizens who are able to work still have the opportunity to leave the labour 
market early and do so on part public transfer income, which is problematic according to theoretical 
framework. 
 
Between 2006 and 2011 the early retirement system underwent major reformation, mainly 
towards a disbanding of the actual system. The 2011 reform limited the early retirement for 
anybody younger than 55 by the end of 2010 to five years. The rest of the population had to wait 
until turning 64 to utilise early retirement and they will only be able to go on three years of early 
retirement and that with a larger degree of payment from personal pension savings. This reform was 
a step in the Social Investment Perspective direction as it dismantled a passive transfer income for 
citizens able to work. 
However, it may become problematic to have no system for early retirement for those that are 
unable to work. This is why the Danish system is complimented by disability pension and senior 
disability pensions. The senior disability pension is an addition to the normal disability pension 
system, however it makes it less difficult for citizens to apply if they are within five years of the 
pension age (Social- & Integrationsministeriet, 2013a). 
 
5 . 4 . 1  P a r t  C o n c l u s i o n  
The development on the early retirement benefits system has in general been a very positive 
one in regards of the theoretical framework as the aim has been towards a dismantling of the 
system. The Danish early retirement system is generally regarded negative as it provides citizens 
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who are able to work with a right to a passive transfer income, which excludes them from fulfilling 
their duty. The reforms have not meant a dismantling of the entire system and are therefore not an 
optimal development as this would have meant a removal of the entire service. 
As mentioned in the chapter it is important to have support for those that are worn down and 
thus cannot work. Such a system was implemented with the latest reform with the implementation 
of a senior disability pension, thereby making the early retirement system even more redundant. 
5 . 5  S t a t e  P e n s i o n s  
With the 1994 pension reform the Danish government ensured citizens higher pensions. 
However, it was made more progressive meaning that savings citizens may possess when they retire 
influences the size of the state pension they will receive. 
Pensions are passive transfer payments which secure against old age and poverty. This both 
ensures a reduction of income inequalities and a continuity of living standards (Morel, Palier, & 
Palme, 2012: 92). Thus, when citizens are too old to work it is their right to receive economic 
support in order to sustain a living. 
However, it is not the duty of the state to 'sponsor' a luxurious retirement. Therefore citizens 
who want more than a basic income are required to save up for the retirement themselves. Whether 
it is positive or negative to raise the general level of state pensions in a Social Investment 
Perspective, is dependent on how much it costs for a retired citizen to sustain a living. The 2003 
reform is also debatable. It granted pensioners without any personal savings or other public support 
an 'elder check' or an addition to the public pension. It is not clearly defined in the theory whether 
the state should provide incentives for personal savings or not, however it can derived from the 
theory, that it is the duty of the citizen to take care of him- or herself when able to. The state 
pension system should be a universal transfer income with little or no other requirements than a 
citizenship and being unable to work. 
Not all citizens will be able to care for themselves, therefore the Danish state pension system 
is in general considered positive in the Social Investment Perspective. 
 
In 2004 an old proposition was reinstated which meant that the first ten years of retirement 
granted a citizen a slightly higher pension payment than the rest of the retirement period. This 
smoothens the transition to pensions and thus lessens income inequalities (ibid: 110). 
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In 2006, the retirement age was gradually raised to 67 from 2024-2027. In the Social 
Investment Perspective citizens are expected to work if they are able (Morel, Palier & Palme, 2012). 
Thus, a rise in the retirement age is a step in the right direction as it equals an increase in the 
workforce. The reform tries to counter the demographic development of decreasing younger 
generations Denmark has experienced recently (US Census Bureau, 2013) which is very positive 
considered the recent discussion about the ‘burden of the elderly’ as this reform helps minimize the 
so-called burden. 
 
5 . 5 . 1  P a r t  C o n c l u s i o n  
It is generally hard to conclude whether the development of the Danish public pension system 
is positive in a Social Investment Perspective. The fundamentals of the system are however very 
positive. The small increases in the pensions are neither good nor bad, since they are most likely to 
be a result of economic fluctuations and price developments and therefore out of the analytical 
boundaries of this project. Generally though, increases in passive transfer payments are to be 
considered negative in the theoretical framework. The increase in the pension age is to be 
considered positive as it increases the workforce. 
 
5 . 6  D i s a b i l i t y  P e n s i o n s  
The system before the 2000/2001 reform allowed for a lifelong grant for disability pension if 
a citizen’s ability to work was reduced by half. In the Social Investment Perspective it is important 
to support those who are unable to work. This is the right of the citizens and the duty of the state. 
However, it is debatable whether a person should be granted a lifelong pension because of 
health issues. A person might get better ten or twenty years after being granted the pension. Part 
time jobs are a good way for citizens with a reduced ability to work to fulfil their duty to work when 
able. 
 
The 2000/2001 reform changed the system in a direction that can be considered positive in the 
Social Investment Perspective. It made the monthly payments universal and slightly higher. This 
fits well with the idea that a person who is unable to work should be able to sustain a fair living. It 
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furthermore increased the requirement of the level of inability citizens should have before being 
granted a disability pension. That is, from 50 percent of disability to 75 percent. 
This is a negative step considering the theory, as such an increase in disability makes it 
increasingly difficult for people with disabilities to sustain a fair living depending on whether these 
citizens are able to find work. On the other hand this reform may provide additional hours of work, 
as an increasing number of citizens will still be available to the labour market even though they may 
only be able to work part time. 
The reform also increased the support for part time jobs with government subsidisation for 
citizens, which is a positive step towards social investment as this may improve citizen’s chances to 
sustain a fair living while enabling them to fulfil their duty to work. This is also positive as the 
citizens are able to work longer and thus contribute more to society. 
 
The 2012 reform further developed on the ideas from the 2000/2001 reform. It firstly enabled 
more applicants to take part time jobs and it was secondly a move away from a system of permanent 
disability pensions except for those who really needed it. 
It introduced individually planned resource programs meant to evaluate an applicant’s ability 
to work in order to be granted disability pension. It was also intended that the resource programs, 
which lasts from one to five years, are meant to aid applicants in finding a part time job if they are 
able to possess such. The Social Investment Perspective is very positive towards up-qualifying and 
education of citizens in order for them to fulfil their duty to work. Therefore, the resource programs 
are to be considered a step in the right direction. 
It can be debated whether the length of the resource programs are fair, however the reform 
ensures that citizens can still receive public transfer incomes while participating in the programs. 
The reform also disbanded the permanently granted disability pensions for citizens under the age of 
40. Recipients of disability pensions under 40 will be re-evaluated at some point in their life to 
examine whether they have or have not regained some of their ability to work. While this might 
seem like an interference in the private life of citizens, one could argue from a Social Investment 
Perspective point of view, that it is fair that the state ensures that people do not fail to fulfil their 
duty to work. For the people working on part time due to a reduced ability to work, the reform also 
ensured them rights when unemployed. They would be granted public support equalling 91 percent 
of unemployment benefits along with the right to a new resource program so they can re- enter the 
part time labour market. This development is definitely positive as it prevents people from moving 
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from jobs into poverty while ensuring that they can get new competencies to re-enter the labour 
market. 
 
5 . 6 . 1  P a r t  C o n c l u s i o n  
In regards of disability pensions, the development in the evaluation of the level of a person’s 
disability has been negative with the increase from 50 percent to 75 percent. However, granting 
citizens with a reduced ability to work better rights to subsidised part time jobs is though a very 
positive development as it allows citizens to sustain a fair living and fulfil their duty to work. 
Furthermore, granting unemployed, previously part time workers, better rights in the form of 
support almost equalling the regular unemployment benefits is also very positive as it allows the 
recipients to sustain a reasonable living. Overall, the development towards a more active support 
with resource programs and more focus towards getting citizens into meaningful jobs is a positive 
development in regards of the Social Investment Perspective since the development has maintained 
the passive support for those who are disabled enough to need it. 
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C h a p t e r  6  
C o n c l u s i o n  
6 . 1  C o n c l u s i o n  
The analysis of this project have dealt specifically with reforms on the Danish labour 
markets since 1993 to 2012, and it has sought to identify the direction the policies regarding the 
labour market is moving in relation to the Social Democratic Social Investment Perspective. Even 
though it is argued that Denmark generally is pursuing a Social Investment Perspective (Morel, 
Palier & Palme, 2012: 112), the different reforms of the Danish labour market cannot exclusively be 
said to pursue it intensively. While some reforms can be linked very easily to the Social Investment 
Perspective, other seem more elusive or may in fact be regarded as a complete setback.  
 
The early retirement system has been reformed to prevent fewer citizens to leave the labour 
market on passive transfer payments while still being able to work. The development in this system 
can be considered positive although a complete removal of the system would have been the best 
possible solution in regards to the Social Investment Perspective. A weaker early retirement service 
has reduced the incentive for individuals to take early retirement and thereby making it a very 
positive movement towards the ideas of the Social Investment Perspective. 
This clearly showed the importance of the balancing of rights and duties, namely that 
everybody who can work should work, and those who are not able to work have the right to a fair 
living. 
 
The disability pension system also showed a positive development in terms of the Social 
Investment Perspective although being more elusive as it included different conditionalities such as 
the mandatory resource programs which an applicant is required to participate in. 
However, since these resource programs focus on finding a meaningful job for the applicant, 
it is considered predominantly positive that a balancing of passive labour market policy with active 
elements has been implemented. Additionally, an increase in the level of disability required for 
receiving disability pension is considered a negative development as citizens with difficulties in 
providing work now have trouble being granted support. However, this negative element was 
combined with resources for said citizens with the aim of granting them work which is an activating 
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policy and thus positive. In theory, it provides an increasing number of citizens with suitable jobs 
made possible by government subsidisation. However, it is also debatable what can be expected of a 
citizen if faced with disability, ultimately making it a somewhat elusive area.  
 
The unemployment benefit system has over the course of the timeframe been subject to a 
number of changes making it a rather puzzling area. The implementation of a time period as well as 
the removals of the passive periods is to be considered a positive development in line with the 
Social Investment Perspective as it successfully combines passive and active labour market policies. 
By removing the so-called passive period and making activation programs mandatory from the first 
day of unemployment can be considered a reduction of the rights of the citizens, due to a complete 
removal of recipient’s possibility of finding a job by themselves. 
Over the course of the time period the unemployment system has been made increasingly 
focused on activation. This is considered positive if the passive period is not altered as the theory 
finds a balance between passive and active labour market polices the most successful. The reform 
can thus be considered a positive development as it enables recipients on unemployment benefits to 
re-enter the labour market faster and combines this with the possibility for citizens to up- qualify 
during periods of unemployment. It must then be concluded that the development of the active part 
in the unemployment system have moved in a social investment direction as it invests in human 
capital, ensuring citizens does not fall into poverty, but increasingly enables them to return to the 
labour market. 
The later development in this area has been to remove rights of the citizens without granting 
new or improving what is left. This was done by reducing the amount of time recipients were able 
to receive unemployment benefits. In the later development, a reduction of the active 
unemployment benefit system was implemented, reducing the unemployment insurance, 
challenging the 'flexicurity' system. The development in this area have therefore been 
predominantly negative according to the Social Investment Perspective as further reductions means 
lesser flexibility on the labour market, something considered very crucial. It furthermore minimizes 
the recipient’s right to be able to sustain a fair living while he or she should be out of work for a 
time. This period is now halved. 
 
The project have also analysed the development in the state pension system and has come to 
conclude that the changes made to the system is neither a clear step towards the Social Investment 
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Perspective nor a step away from it. The increases in the pension payments are generally negative in 
the Social Investment Perspective as they increase a passive transfer payment. However, the project 
realises that there might be reasons for this that are out of the analytical boundaries of the project 
and it therefore cannot finally conclude on this.  
 
The social security area has also been analysed. It is considered somewhat elusive due to 
some changes being in line and other not with the Social Investment Perspective. Of negative 
changes the labour market activity conditionality can be mentioned. This will exempt some citizens 
from the system who actually need it and thus make these citizens more vulnerable to poverty. On 
the other hand there has also been a slight positive development, namely the activation part of the 
system that provides the necessary capabilities to ensure recipients easier re-entrance into the labour 
market. The system as such is well in line with the basic ideas of the Social Investment Perspective 
since it is a transfer income that ensures citizens ability to sustain a reasonable living if they are not 
able to take care of themselves. 
 
The overall conclusion to be drawn from this is that the different labour market areas present 
various and opposing developments towards or away from the Social Investment Perspective. The 
most prominent development away from the Social Investment Perspective is the halving of the 
unemployment benefit period. This was a development that shook the very foundation of the 
flexicurity system which especially the Danish system is built upon. This is not compensated for by 
the increased activation and thus balancing of active and passive labour market policies which the 
reform also implemented, and it is thus a clear move away from the Social Investment Perspective. 
Other developments such as the increase of state pensions, which was an increase in passive 
benefits have been negative, but this may be made up for by the increase of the retirement age and it 
is hard to conclude whether the development has been towards or away the Social Investment 
Perspective. Furthermore, the cut in early retirement benefits is problematic to worn out people, but 
this was compensated for by an implementation of senior disability pension, in order for these 
people to be granted support and to be able to phase out the early retirement benefit entirely which 
is considered very positive due to the removal of a passive labour market policy. Moreover, an 
increase in the hours citizens should have worked before being granted social security is 
problematic due the conditional nature of the reform. It prevents some citizens from receiving the 
benefit and thus makes it less universal. Though, this may be made up for by the increased focus on 
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activation in the form of evaluation and thus availability to the labour market, the mandatory 
education for recipients under 25 along with the removal of the start help which made the social 
security benefit more universal and in line with the Social Investment Perspective. Finally, it was 
problematic to increase the level of disability citizens must have in order for them to receive 
disability pension, but the negative impact this development would have had was compensated for 
by the increased subsidisation for disabled people in part time jobs and the requirement of on-going 
evaluation of the level of disability of recipients under 40 years old. 
In conclusion, it is very difficult to precisely answer the question how Denmark is moving 
towards the Social Investment Perspective, as there have been numerous developments. 
Nonetheless, the analysis shows predominant tendencies in the Danish labour market policies 
towards the Social Investment Perspective. 
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C h a p t e r  7  
C r i t i q u e  &  P e r s p e c t i v i s a t i o n  
7 . 1  C r i t i q u e  
Even though the Social Investment Perspective has received recognition at an international 
level and in many European countries in form of e.g. the Lisbon strategy (Morel, Palier & Palme: 
117),  it has still been subject to some criticism. This critique relates partly to the implementation of 
social policies, in correlation to the Social Investment Perspective. 
 
The first point of critique relates to the redistribution of resources associated with the strategy 
of social investment. It states that the focus on investing in the future by redirecting expenditures 
from passive labour market policies towards activation and spending on family services and 
education has meant that today’s poor has been left aside and increased poverty - ultimately 
meaning that social policies of today has become less adequate of relieving poverty. In short, the 
redistributive profile of Social Investment Perspective is less ‘pro-poor’ (ibid: 15). 
A second point of critique, also in relation to the activation policies, is that it is just a 
continuation of the neoliberal ‘workfare’ policies, as it justifies a cutback in benefits for certain 
groups (such as lone parents or people on long term sickness leave) meaning the quality of work has 
been sidelined in favor of any work (any job is a good job). In short, this justification has 
represented a view where the importance of a job is preferred, rather “[…]than a shift towards 
upskilling and the development of ‘more and better jobs’” (ibid). 
Another point of critique is put forward by feminists and gender theorist, highlighting the 
problem of gender equality being instrumentalised in favour of economic objectives rather than 
being a real concern with women’s aspirations. Linked to this problem is also that children has 
become instrumentalised as ‘citizen-workers’ of the future rather than as ‘citizens-children’ of the 
present with social rights as being non-productive children. The coherence of these points of 
critique is that the former rationale for a welfare state, based on humanitarian and social principles, 
is no longer sufficient and is therefore traded for a economic rationale, often allowing for some 
ambiguity in the goal of the social investment perspective when assigned the actual policy making 
(ibid: 16-17). 
 
56 
 
This ambiguity related to the social investment perspective is linked to the problem that there 
is no clear and singular distinction of this perspective. Two strategies are however, linked to the 
Social Investment Perspective and is heavily debated as being the one true perspective; The social 
democratic way, proposed by Gøsta Esping-Andersen and The Third Way, proposed Anthony 
Giddens. “We see here, however, not only a battle between two well-known intellectuals struggling 
for policy influence but also the range and ambiguity of the notion” (ibid: 82). 
These strategies share a common understanding of the inadequacies of the post-war welfare 
states, essential to the social investment state perspective. They do however differ on other quite 
essential key points like the meaning of social citizenship in a knowledge based economy.  
  
These different understandings revolve around a set of key points. The first point is the 
understanding of when social expenditures can be perceived as either productive or unproductive. 
To illustrate when the two strategies diverge, an example of unemployment benefits will be used: 
The social democratic branch of the Social Investment Perspective perceives unemployment 
benefits as the means to protect human capital of the working adults and as a prevention for 
unemployed to be caught up in a spiral of debt and poverty, thereby also increasing the chance for 
unemployed to return faster to the labor market, given that they are supported by adequate 
activation policies. In this aspect the Third Way branch perceives unemployment benefits as being 
an unproductive expenditure - generous benefits is generally seen as generating fraud and social 
dependency (ibid: 18). Essentially this difference relates to divergence on the perception of ‘rights 
and duties’ within the social sphere. The social democratic branch relies more heavily on the rights 
of citizens, whereas the Third Way branch relies more heavily on duties of citizens. In addition the 
perception of equality differs from the two strategies - the social democratic branch perceives 
equality as a precondition for economic efficiency and the adherent social investment branch should 
seek to reduce inequality.  
On the other hand the Third Way perceives inequality as a necessary ingredient for economic 
efficiency like the neoliberal paradigm. 
 
This has made the role assigned to social policy differ a lot between the two strategies. In the 
social democratic branch: “[…] social policy is expected to provide people with both the necessary 
capabilities and incentives and with necessary security to accompany the changing needs of the 
economy [...]” (ibid: 18-19). This branch can be seen as resting upon an investment strategy and a 
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protection strategy. In accordance the Third Way concerns itself with the restructuring of passive 
labour market policies to active labour market policies. Natalie Morel puts these strategies as 
covering different umbrella’s with the social democratic branch being inspired by the Nordic 
welfare states, while the Third Way branch represents an anglo-liberal view of social policies. 
Ultimately, this ambiguity in the social investment perspective is arguable what has enabled such a 
broad adoption of this concept, e.g. in relation to the Lisbon strategy. One of the pitfalls related to 
the Social Investment Perspective is that countries and other policy communities have been able to 
appeal either to one strategy or even a combination of the two: “[...]a social investment perspective 
can...take on multiple correlations.” (Morel, 82: 2012). This allows for policy communities to make 
arguments for a change in social policies: “[...] while wavering the social investment banner in the 
name of new times [...] despite what this change might bring.” (ibid: 82).  
 
 
7 . 1 . 1  C r i t i q u e  o f  t h e  M e t h o d s  
 First of all this project has utilised a normative methodological approach, implying that the 
world is considered measureable with the right tools. As a consequence of the ontological approach 
this project is therefore only able to draw conclusions based on the view that structures in society 
are recognised and that society is considered as a whole, implying that is able to draw general rules 
from it. This has enabled this project to shed light upon the specific topic it is investigating, but it 
has prevented it from discussing any of these structures or to consider individuals. 
It is also a point of critique that this project solely has a focus on secondary quantitative data 
as it may be argued that the qualitative data could enable this project to make a more thorough 
analysis of Denmark in accordance with the Social Investment Perspective. The choice is 
preventing the project from investigating other parts of the Social Investment Perspective needing 
qualitative data. 
7 . 2  P e r s p e c t i v i s a t i o n  
In view of the theory further study may lay on multiple different aspects, for instance on the 
pillars that are not fully analysed and discussed in this project. These include a focus on the family 
pillar of the theory and an increased focus on the educational pillar of the theory. Projects similar to 
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the one in hand can be made, wherein Danish legislation is analysed in order to determine whether 
or not Denmark is moving towards a Social Investment Perspective. 
 
 Thus, this project focuses mostly on the labour market and does this by using Denmark as a 
case study. Further investigation in both the labour market and the other parts of the Social 
Investment Perspective can be made by looking into how other countries relate to the theory. These 
countries could include countries that arguably follow the social democratic welfare regime, such as 
Sweden and Norway, but one could also investigate countries following other welfare regimes, such 
as Germany following the conservative welfare state (ibid: 36). Naturally all three pillars of the 
theory can be analysed either individually or together within the realm of either Conservative, 
Liberal or the Social Democratic welfare regimes.  
 
 This project has mostly analysed the expenditure side of the Social Investment State 
whereas the income side have not been discussed. Further investigation in income taxation, value 
added taxes and other sources of taxation would be relevant to investigate in the light of Social 
Investment Theory. A primary goal of such a project could be to investigate where the theory would 
place taxation in relation to rights and duties and how it links taxation and the labour market. 
 
 One could in another project discuss the reforms in relation to both the Social Investment 
State and John Rawls' definition of Fairness. In this case it would be relevant to analyse whether the 
reforms moved towards a Social Investment State, as was done in this project, and at the same time 
investigate if the reforms correlates with Rawls' definition of fairness. 
 
It must furthermore be noted that this project has utilized the Social Democratic branch of the 
Social Investment Perspective. The analysis may therefore have been different when utilizing the 
other Third Way branch of the theory. 
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